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Abstract 
Discerning family resemblances in the world of theories can be useful for several reasons. For 
one thing, noticing that two theories share the traits of a family of theories may help us to 
understand each of them better. Secondly, noticing the family resemblances may help us to 
model them more easily. In particular, the modern software development technique of object-
oriented programming leverages family resemblances among different software “objects” to 
increase the ease of development, and so dovetails very well with the effort to pick out 
“families” on a more theoretical level. In this paper, we note the large family of two-
population social cycle theories, all based on a pattern of disruptions and adjustments akin to 
the well-known predator-prey model.  
 









1 We appreciate comments and support of Alex Fink, André Casajus, Björn Urbansky, Katharina 
Lamster, Bert Tieben, Gary Mongiovi, Sanford Ikeda, Mario Rizzo, Bruce Caldwell, Tony Lawson, Young Back 
Choi and several anonymous referees. All remaining errors are ours. 
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1 Introduction 
"there is a rhythm of sentiment which we can observe in ethics, in religion, and in 
politics as waves resembling the business cycle."—Vilfredo Pareto (2000, p. 31) 
 
This paper sets out to describe and begin modeling what we argue is a related group of 
theories of social cycles, all built on the framework of two populations, each of which disrupts 
the other, and adjusts to those disruptions, leading to the emergence of cyclical patterns in 
society. We find all of these theories akin to the well-known predator-prey model.  
Discerning family resemblances2 in the world of theories can be useful for several 
reasons. For one thing, noticing that two theories share the traits of a family of theories may 
help us to understand each of them better. Secondly, noticing the family resemblances may 
help us to model them more easily. In particular, the modern software development technique 
of object-oriented programming leverages family resemblances among different software 
“objects” to increase the ease of development, and so dovetails very well with the effort to 
pick out “families” on a more theoretical level. The usefulness of such an effort is, we believe, 
on evidence in several prominent, earlier undertakings of this type: For instance, David 
Lewis’s work Convention (2002) seeks to identify the essential characteristics common to the 
various phenomena we call conventions, as well as to note how, despite sharing those 
characteristics, we can identify certain common variations among types of conventions, based 
on how they differ in embodying those essential elements. Similarly, Thomas Schelling 
(2006) analyzes and classifies families of situations involving cooperation and conflict where 
2 See Wittgenstein (1953) on the idea of family resemblances. Alexander et al. (1977) explores the idea 
of families of design similarities in the realm of architecture, calling the result “a pattern language.” 
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people are making interdependent decisions.3 And Gottfried Haberler (1946) sets out a 
detailed schemata of business-cycle theories attempting to place them into a family tree. 
We will begin our effort by analytically isolating some essential patterns common to 
theories of social cycles. We will then employ these patterns to create a simple, four-way 
classification scheme of such theories. We next note that our interest lies in the theories in one 
of those four boxes. We will next seek for very simple examples of cycles fitting into that 
box, work our way up to more complex instances, and seek to note the family resemblances 
we find along the way. On our journey, we will examine: 
1) Adam Smith’s theory of cycles in fashion. 
 2) The Aristotelean-Polybian theory of anacyclosis. 
3) Giambattista Vico’s theory of a cycle of civilizational forms. 
4) Vilfredo Pareto's theory of circulation of the elites.  
5) Financial-market models of value investors and trend followers. 
6) Hyman Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis. 
7) Joseph Schumpeter’s theory of creative destruction and economic development. 
8) R.M. Goodwin’s theory of the business cycle. 
It should be noted that only the eighth member of the list was chosen because it had a two-
population model: in the other cases, we had already picked the theories before noticing this 
pattern. 
We wrap things up by showing how detecting this family resemblance has aided us in 
developing agent-based models of several of these cycle theories. 
3 In fact, Schelling proposes a family of cycle theories we might term “thermostat theories” (2006, pp. 
83-89), which involve simple overshooting, and contrast nicely with the family we intend to present. 
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2 Our Fundamental Concepts, and the Resulting Classification 
Scheme 
Abstracting the essential nature of cyclical phenomena in the natural world has attracted some 
attention. For instance, Alfred North Whitehead, discussing such cycles, wrote: 
In the Way of Rhythm a round of experiences, forming a determinate sequence of 
contrasts attainable within a definite method, are codified so that the end of one such 
cycle is the proper antecedent stage for the beginning of another such cycle. The cycle is 
such that its own completion provides the conditions for its own mere repetition. (1958, p. 
21, emphasis ours) 
The emphasized portion of the above quote is very important for us: for there to be true, 
endogenous social cycles, there have to be patterns of social activity the completion of which 
provides the conditions for their own repetition. In particular, what we mean by a true and 
endogenous social cycle is different from the fact that people will tend to flock to the beach in 
the summer, and the ski slopes in the winter, that they tend to use more artificial lighting in 
the evening than in the day, or that harvest festivals are in the fall while lamb is eaten in the 
spring. A social scientist may be curious as to why, say, people go to the beach or why there 
are harvest festivals at all, but given these things exist, it is pretty obvious why they happen 
when they do. While, as we will see in our subsequent schema, these are true cycles, the 
generation of the cyclicality is clearly exogenous to the social world. We may march through 
the same typical sequences of events repeatedly, but the fault is in our stars, or our solar 
system, or the Big Bang, or God. But the basic cyclicality is not a social product, and the 
social component consists in the chosen response to a cycle beyond human control.  
What is of particular interest to the social scientist are cycles that arise endogenously 
in the social world. And not just that: are there purely social cycles that occur without being 
4 
 
intended by anyone? So, if a village holds a maypole dance, there is not much of a puzzle as 
to why the dancers keep winding up in the same places: that is what they intended to do. But 
if an economy repeatedly arrives at a high level of unemployment, or a political regime keeps 
cycling through periods of order and of chaos, then those events are far more curious. 
Presumably, no one has arranged to have periodic business downturns or regular episodes of 
violent disorder, but there they are. 
A possible explanation to the puzzle of why such states recur is, “Well, stuff happens.” 
This is largely the approach to the business cycle taken by proponents of Real Business Cycle 
Theory: the economy suffers a shock, things get worse for a bit, the economy adjusts, things 
get better, and at some time in the future another shock occurs. The appearance of cyclicality 
is an illusion, produced by “random waves” (see Chatterjee, 2000). 
That sudden “shocks” hit the system is an interesting possibility, and we do not wish 
to dispute that it may even be true. But many prominent social theorists claim to have detected 
truly, endogenously, and spontaneously (unintentionally) cyclical social phenomena, and to 
have identified the cause of the cyclicality. Our research questions are, “What family 
resemblances, if any, do we find amongst such theories?” and “How can recognizing these 
resemblances help us to model them?” 
2.2 A Simple Classification Matrix 
Our working hypothesis is that all social cycles, and thus all plausible theories of such cycles, 
are characterized by patterns of disruptions and adjustments. A disruption we define as an 
event that interferes with the smooth progress of the plans of one or more social actors. 
Adjustments are the means by which agents whose plans were disrupted respond to that 
disruption in order to continue toward realizing their goals as best they can in light of the new 
circumstances confronting them. 
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As a first step toward understanding the occurrence of cycles in social life, we 
distinguish stabilizing from destabilizing adjustments.4 A stabilizing adjustment creates, over 
the time frame in question, a series of further adjustments by others, that are, at each moment 
of time, of a lesser magnitude than the adjustment under examination. A de-stabilizing 
adjustment, on the contrary, creates over the time frame in question a series of further 
adjustments that are, at each moment, of a greater magnitude than the adjustment under 
examination.  
Based on this distinction, adjustment processes may induce a cycle if they result in a 
significant period of largely destabilizing adjustments followed by a significant period of 
generally stabilizing adjustments. To generate a recurring, endogenous cycle, this pattern of 
adjustments must itself, somehow, lead to a situation in which disruptions similar to those that 
started the cycle are the likely result of agents’ efforts to realize their goals. So in examining 
various cycle theories, one thing we will look at whether the disruptions that generate the 
cyclical behavior are endogenous to the theory, or appear from outside its scope. 
We might formalize this notion using the simple logistic equation that is often used for 
population growth, dD / dt = rD (1 – D / K), where D is the number of people experiencing 
destabilization, r is the rate of destabilization, and K is the “carrying population,” which here 
we can intuitively interpret as a limit to how much of the population can be destabilized by 
others’ adjustments at one time: certainly, by the time over half the population is involved in 
4 Similarly, Haberler (1946, p. 276) wonders whether there are self-reinforcing processes that will bring 
the system further away from equilibrium whenever it is disrupted (exogenously or endogenously). 
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responding to a previous destabilization, that leaves less than half the population to be 
destabilized by that adjustment, assuming the adjusters are not engaged in self-destabilizing.5 
 A separate question is whether a theory provides a reason why truly cyclical patterns 
should occur at all. Here, the question is whether we can expect something similar to the 
initial disruption to recur, whether or not its source is endogenous or exogenous to the 
theory.6 If a theory gives us a reason to expect recurring patterns of disruptions at semi-
regular intervals7, then we classify it as a “true” cycle theory; if not, it is a “pseudo” cycle 
theory. 
We believe it is important to distinguish these two dimensions of cycle theories 
because logic does not forbid, and history provides examples of, cycle theories that posit true, 
exogenous cycles: cycle theories pointing to sunspots and other such extra-human factors 
were once fairly popular. In such theories, because, say, sunspots wax and wane in a cyclical 
pattern, the effects they are purported to have on human economies can cause them to cycle in 
a similar fashion. The cycle is clearly caused exogenously: no one ever posited that business 
activity could cause sunspots! On the other hand, a theory is both endogenous and a true cycle 
theory when the pattern of adjustments to an initial disruption is such that we can expect those 
5 Of course, there are many complexities that could be introduced here, such as the possibility that, even 
while the majority of actors or trying to self-stabilize, their actions are meanwhile defeating the plans of others: 
collective action problems, such as the Keynesian “paradox of thrift,” are of this nature. But nevertheless, even 
processes like that have some inherent limit: If everyone tries to save more, but instead has their income reduced, 
than cannot gone on forever: it is a safe assumption that aggregate income will never go to nothing as a result of 
an attempt by everyone to increase their savings. 
6 How similar this subsequent disruption ought to be to the original one will be a matter of detail 
internal to particular cycle theories. 
7 How regular is “semi-regular”? Again, we believe that is best answered within particular theories. 
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adjustments, over some semi-regular time frame, to finally result in something resembling the 
initial disruption to be brought about by those very adjustments. 
This gives us a 2-by-2 matrix of cycle theory classification, from which we intend to 
explore the type of theories contained in the top left box, or true, endogenous cycles: 
 
 Endogenous generation Exogenous generation 
True cycle Ex: Circulation of the elites Ex: Ski season / swim season 
Pseudo Cycle Ex: Arab oil embargo Ex: Random shocks produced 
by extreme weather events 
 
3 A Simple Social Cycle Example: Merging onto a Highway 
We will now proceed by fleshing out our ideal types with some plausible content. We start 
with a fairly simple example of a social cycle, examining what occurs when drivers are forced 
to merge onto a busy highway at low speeds. This shall help clarify our scheme and visualize 
the concepts of adjustment and disruptions. We demonstrate how the concept of disruption 
and adjustment can give way to behavior that on aggregate produces a cyclical pattern.  
 Above, we have defined stabilizing adjustments as those that generate further 
adjustments by others, that are, at each moment of time, of a lesser magnitude than the 
adjustment being evaluated, and de-stabilizing adjustments as those that prompt subsequent 
adjustments of greater magnitude. But estimating the magnitude of adjustments necessary in 
response to some disruption, in order to judge them stabilizing or de-stabilizing, often could 
prove to be a tricky matter. One of the attractions of the present example is that it reduces this 
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problem to the relatively easy one of measuring deviations in driving speed from an initially 
planned speed: In one phase of the cycle, we have de-stabilizing adjustments: those 
adjustments are increasing the total deviation of driving speed from driver’s preferred speed. 
The adjustments are stabilizing in the phase of the cycle when that total deviation is 
decreasing, e.g., drivers are returning to the speed they preferred before the initial disruption. 
And note that in the present example, the phases of the cycle, for drivers as a whole, are 
spread out geographically, not chronologically: while some drivers nearing an entrance are 
entering the “downturn” phase of the cycle, others well past the entrance are simultaneously 
in the “recovery” phase. (But individual drivers see the cycle chronologically.) 
So let us picture a busy highway with entrances and exits every mile. The entrances 
are not well-designed: there is no lane for smoothly merging into traffic while getting up to 
speed, but a stop sign at the end of the entrance ramp. (This, in fact, is pretty much a 
description of the Merritt Parkway in Connecticut as of 30 years ago.) What this means is that 
every time heavy traffic nears an entrance, there occurs a cluster of disruptions, as people 
enter the existing traffic at a slow speed and force those already on the highway to adjust. 
Imagine a car, in this situation, entering into the right lane, the lane in which you are 
driving, at low speed, a short distance ahead of you. You typically have two adjustments to 
this disruption that might enable you to avoid a collision (which is likely to be the worst 
disruption possible!): 
1) You can slam on your breaks; or 
2) You can shift over to the left lane. 
Which of these (if either) is stabilizing and which de-stabilizing will depend upon the 
traffic pattern around you. Now, imagine there are four cars following closely behind you in 
the right lane, but the left lane is empty. Then, hitting the breaks is de-stabilizing, since your 
adjustment will result in a greater magnitude of adjustments in its wake—in response to my 
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breaking, four other cars must similarly adjust, resulting in four times the magnitude of 
adjustment. Shifting lanes will be a stabilizing adjustment, since in response to your move, no 
one else has to do anything—there is zero times your adjustment as a result of your choice. 
But if traffic is heavy, say at rush hour, either adjustment is usually de-stabilizing, 
since the left lane is also packed with cars. In such circumstances, the disruption of a driver 
merging at a low speed inevitably will produce a cascade of further disruptions, as the 
adjustments made by drivers breaking for merging automobiles thwarts the plans of other 
drivers who wish to continue at a steady speed. Thus we get a logjam around the entrance 
ramp. This is the downturn phase of our cycle. 
But, gradually, the adjustments begin to produce dovetailing plans again, as drivers re-
establish comfortable spacing between themselves and other vehicles, and regain the speed 
they had before the disruptions at the entrance ramp. This is the recovery phase of the cycle. 
But just as our recovery is nearly complete, another wave of disruptions occurs — we have 
reached the next entrance ramp. 
Here we have a simple social cycle with a period of roughly one minute (if the non-
disrupted driving speed is about 60 miles per hour), exhibiting the characteristics of our ideal 
type very clearly. What’s more, this is very much like what driving on the Merritt Parkway 
really was like thirty years ago, demonstrating that even such a simple model can capture an 
important aspect of a real-world phenomenon. 
What we have just described is a genuine cycle: there is a good reason for us to expect 
the pattern to repeat at quite regular intervals. But its source is exogenous: the disruptions 
arise from outside the flow of traffic on the highway itself. The placement and design of the 
entrances is the cause of the disruptions.8 In this respect, it is similar to a sunspot theory of the 
8 See Kerner (2009) for an analysis of traffic that includes endogenous generation of such jams. 
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business cycle. (Although the entrances were placed where they were by human beings, those 
humans were external to the traffic flow, and so exogenous to the cyclical activity.) Let us 
turn our attention to genuine cycles that are also endogenous. 
4 Identifying a Family of True and Endogenous Social Cycle 
Theories 
After having outlined a very basic examples of a genuine social cycle, we move on to analyze 
more complex theories of social cycles. If we detect a similar basic pattern in a significant 
family of these more complex theories, this will be a finding of some importance, especially 
for enabling re-use of large elements of a model of one of these theories in modeling another 
one. Space will not permit us to present any of these theories in detail. Instead, we shall 
present the theories in a nutshell to seek the mechanism producing the cyclical pattern for 
some core theories of the social sciences. 
 a. Adam Smith’s Theory of Fads in Fashion 
We don't follow fashion 
That would be a joke 
You know we're going to set them, set them 





We will begin to analyze fads in social customs, such as fashions, using the ideal types 
posited above. We will analyze one famous example from the literature.9 Adam Smith 
commented on fashion as follows: 
Fashion is different from custom, or rather is a particular species of it. That is not the 
fashion which every body wears, but which those wear who are of a high rank, or 
character. The graceful, the easy, and commanding manners of the great, joined to the 
usual richness and magnificence of their dress, give a grace to the very form which they 
happen to bestow upon it. As long as they continue to use this form, it is connected in our 
imaginations with the idea of something that is genteel and magnificent, and though in 
itself it should be indifferent, it seems, on account of this relation, to have something 
about it that is genteel and magnificent too. As soon as they drop it, it loses all the grace, 
which it had appeared to possess before, and being now used only by the inferior ranks of 
people, seems to have something of their meanness and awkwardness. (Smith, 1790, Part 
V, Chapter 1) 
Following Smith, let us posit a population consisting of two types of people: there is T, is a 
small group of people who are trend-setters. They want to be on the leading edge and want to 
have (wear, exhibit, etc.) what only some others have and to be recognized for this by their 
9 We think it is important to clarify our intent here: there exists an extensive social science literature on fads and 
fashion, which we will largely ignore. That is because our aim, in this section, is not to present a superior theory 
of fads to existing alternatives, but to show how our ideal types can be employed to construct a plausible theory 
of fads, with the aim of elucidating the types themselves. Therefore, it is of little importance to us that there may 
be some theory of fads that captures empirical reality better than Smith’s theory: if such a theory exists, it would 




                                                 
peers.  F is a large group of people who are followers. They want to have what everybody else 
has (wears, etc.).  
In a fad, first the population of T mutually coordinates around some fashion or other 
cultural element, φ. What they wish is to identify themselves as members of T by adopting φ 
while other members of T but only other members of T do so. 
 As φ becomes widespread amongst T, the members of F begin to notice it doing so. 
The plans of the members of F have been disrupted. What they want is to have what 
everybody else has, to wear what everyone else wears, and especially if those others are the 
trend-setters. The more members of F learn about the new fad, the more members of F realize 
they are behind the times. Therefore, they adopt φ in an effort to adjust to the disruption the 
adoption of φ by the members of T created in their plans. The initial coordinative adjustments 
of the members of T around the new fashion turns out to be destabilizing as it results in a 
series of adjustments that are greater than the initial adjustment for the members of F. 
 But what is a desirable situation to members of F is very displeasing to members of T: 
if the "rubes" have adopted φ, then it is no longer hip. The adoption by the members of F 
itself is a disruption of the plans for the members of T. As φ diffuses through F, members of T 
find themselves no longer on the cutting edge, so they adjust plans again by seeking for some 
new "cutting edge" fashion to adopt. When they do so, we are back at the start of the cycle 
above. But since the adjustment of members of F results in a series of smaller adjustments 
than did those of the small group of T, the adoption of the fad can be characterized as 
stabilizing adjustments. 
Once again, we can look to population biology to formalize our intuitions here in a 
simple way: in this case, the Lotka-Volterra equations relating predator and prey populations. 
In this case, the trend-setters are the “prey,” and the followers the “predators.” (Of course, we 
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imply no normative judgment here of whether trend-setters or followers are better people!) 
So, we have: 
dx / dt = x(α – βy) 
dy / dt = -y(γ – δx) 
where x are the trend-setters adopting a fad, and y are the rest of the population that 
follows the trend-setters. This system of equations can produce wave-like cycles with the 
followers’ cycle lagging that of the trend-setters, as we would wish it to. 
 This analysis is, of course, highly simplified: We really have an entire spectrum of 
people from extreme trend-setters who are happy to, say, wear something no one else at all 
wears, to followers so sluggardly that they are barely now adopting fashions from a decade 
ago. But the two-population model captures the essence of the phenomenon: the widespread 
adoption of the fashion generates the actions that will lead to its abandonment. The cyclical 
movement is endogenous to the phenomenon itself. 
This stands in sharp contrast to an exogenous fashion cycle: the change in clothing 
worn, in temperate climates, from winter to summer. This, also, is a true cycle, but the driver 
of the cycle is something quite outside of the realm of fashion, namely, the relative 
movements of the earth and the sun. 
b.  The Aristotelian-Polybian Cycle of Constitutional Forms 
First, the Greek philosopher Aristotle, and later the Greek historian Polybius, based on 
Aristotle’s ideas, formulated a theory of anacyclosis, or the cycling of political constitutions. 
While Aristotle (1992) presents a very complex and subtle analysis of constitutional changes, 
Polybius’s is a simplified version, so we will focus on the latter.  
Polybius describes the basic cycle of political forms as follows: 
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Now the first of these [political forms] to come into being is monarchy, it's growth being 
natural and unaided; and next arises kingship derived from monarchy by the aid of art 
and by the correction of defects. Monarchy first changes into its vicious allied form, 
tyranny; and next, the abolishment of both gives birth to aristocracy. Aristocracy by its 
very nature degenerates into oligarchy; and when the commons inflamed by anger take 
vengeance on this government for its unjust rule, democracy comes into being; and in due 
course the licence and lawlessness of this form of government produces mob-rule to 
complete the series. The truth of what I have just said will be quite clear to anyone who 
pays due attention to such beginnings, origins, and changes as are in each case natural. 
For he alone who has seen how each form naturally arises and develops, will be able to 
see when, how, and where the growth, perfection, change, and end of each are likely to 
occur again. And it is to the Roman constitution above all that this method, I think, may 
be successfully applied, since from the outset its formation and growth have been due to 
natural causes. (1924, Book VI) 
The causal process can be boiled down as follows: 
Sketched in rather broad strokes, the mechanism goes roughly as follows: the simple 
good regime degenerates into its vicious form, because the new generations, the king's 
children, for example, take their advantages for granted and give into their appetites, and 
thus they provoke the revolt that brings about the new simple regime that will in its turn 
undergo the same alteration and the same fate. (Manent, 2013, p. 180) 
Here, we again have two populations, the rulers (who may be only the king, or the aristocracy, 
or the majority of the people) and the ruled (who may be everyone but the king, everyone but 
the aristocracy, or those in the minority in a democracy), with the actions of one population 
disrupting the plans of another, and causing that second population to make adjustments and 
leading to a constitutional change. 
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At the start, the political regime is well-accepted by the ruled. The rulers are glad to be 
in power. The ruled, on the other hand, accept the rulers and political regime as long as the 
rulers maintain a decently functioning social order providing civil peace. 
After some time, being in power produces the urge in the rulers to expand their 
influence, and little-by-little they treat the ruled worse. The rulers begin to place their self-
interest above their interest in the good of the polis. For a while this abuse may go unnoticed. 
At some point the majority of the ruled feel unhappy with the rulers. In order to keep stability 
the rulers may need to repress the ruled even more. This will amplify the tensions between the 
two groups. The ruled begin to want a new constitution.  
The cycle theory is again one of disruption and adjustment. The initial disruption is the 
rise in the rulers’ self-interestedness. The more the rulers use their position for their own gain, 
the more people will find the situation displeasing and become hostile toward the ruler. Thus, 
we have a stream of adjustments that cause greater adjustments over the time period in 
question. At a point the rulers will be pushed out and a new constitution is installed. 
The cycle finally comes around to the beginning again when democracy turns into 
mob rule, as described by Aristotle: 
From inspection of the other cases also you can see the changes take place pretty well 
after the same manner: in order to win the favour of the multitude they [demagogues] 
treat the notables unjustly and cause them to unite. Sometimes they make them split up 
their possessions or income in order to finance their public duties; sometimes they bring 
slanderous accusations against the rich with a view to confiscating their money. (1992, p. 
311) 
This sets the stage for a return to monarchy.  
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c. Vico’s Cycle of Civilizational Forms 
Giambattista Vico was an 18th-century Neapolitan thinker. For some time his work languished 
in obscurity, but interest in it was revived by thinkers such as Marx, Nietzsche and Joyce. One 
of his most famous contributions is his cyclical view of history. On examining Vico’s cycle of 
civilizational forms we find that it also displays the pattern of two populations disrupting each 
other and adjusting to the disruptions in order to produce the cycle. For instance, cities 
themselves arise from the interaction of two distinct populations: 
The origin of cities, which developed from extended families which included both 
children and servants. We find that cities were naturally founded on two communities, 
the nobles who commanded and the plebeians who obeyed: for these two parts make up 
the entire polity or law of civil governments. I shall show that the first cities could not 
have arisen at all merely on the basis of simple nuclear families. (1999, pp. 16-17) 
As civilizational forms progress from the Age of the Gods through the Age of Heroes to the 
Age of Men, governmental forms progress from theocracy through aristocracy to democracy. 
The two-population model drives the changes. For instance, Vico describes the impetus 
driving the change from aristocracy to democracy as follows: 
The plebeians of the heroic age now grew numerous and warlike besides, which 
frightened the [aristocracy], who must have been very few in a commonwealth 
comprising so few citizens. By the force of their numbers, the plebeians began to enact 
laws without senate authority, so that the commonwealths changed from aristocratic to 
democratic. (1999, p. 441) 
The conditions for the repetition of the cycle come about through the degeneration of the 
democratic form of government as the majority become “like beasts,” and the subsequent 
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regeneration of civil life by a second, remnant population that returns to the simplicity of the 
start of the cycle: 
Like beasts, such people [in late democracy] are accustomed to think of nothing but their 
own personal advantage, and in their extreme fastidiousness, or rather pride, they are 
filled with bestial rage and resentment at the least provocation. Although their bodies are 
densely crowded together, they live like monstrous beasts in the utter solitude of their 
private wills and desires… [causing] their obstinate factional strife and desperate civil 
wars to turn their cities into forests and their forests into human lairs… Eventually, the 
few survivors, finding themselves amid an abundance of life’s necessities, naturally 
become sociable. Returning to the pay but it’s simplicity of the early world of peoples, 
they naturally become religious, truthful, and faithful. (1999, pp. 488-489) 
Thus we find ourselves back in the Age of the Gods. 
d. Pareto’s Circulation of the Elites 
Vilfredo Pareto is best know to economists for his work on social welfare (Pareto 
improvements, etc.), but he also wrote extensively on political sociology. Of particular 
interest to us is his theory of the circulation of the elites in society. Here again, we find a two-
population model, where the adjustments of one population to the disruptions caused by the 
other population drive the cycle. In Pareto’s case, the two populations are a currently ruling 
but decrepit elite, and a new rising elite class, poised to take over. 
The decline of the old elite, for Pareto, follows a quasi-biological law that dictates that 
social groups decline with age just as organisms do. Of the predicament of the current but 
declining elite Pareto says: 
1. The declining elite becomes softer, milder, more humane and less apt to defend 
its own power. 
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2. On the other hand, it does not lose its rapacity and greed for the goods of 
others, but rather tends as much as possible to increase its unlawful appropriations and to 
indulge in major usurpations of the national patrimony. 
Thus, on the one hand it makes the yoke heavier, and on the other it has less 
strength to maintain it. (2000, p. 59) 
It is these increasing disruptions that drive the new elite to fight (whether through violence or 
political means) and eventually displace the old. As an elite declines, its best tend to join the 
rising new elite instead of sinking with the old: “When… a gentleman is faced with the 
dilemma of either proving the malpractices of his class such as embezzlements of banks… or 
of his joining the socialists, he is irresistibly driven towards the latter” (2000, p. 73). 
Naturally, however, the youthful vigor of the new elite will not last: 
For the time being, the new elite is flexible and open to all, but after the victory the same 
that happened to others will happen to it also: after victory, the elite becomes more rigid 
and more exclusive. (2000, p. 86) 
It is clear that this sets up the same conditions that led to the rise of the new elite in the first 
place. And thus Pareto’s two-population model returns to a point where the cycle will repeat. 
e. Investment Behavior and Financial Market Cycles 
“It is well known at the Stock Exchange the public at large buys only in a rising 
market and sells in a declining one. The financiers who, because of their greater 
practice in this business, use their reason to a greater extent, although they too 
sometimes allow themselves to be swayed by sentiment, do the opposite, and this 




Our two-population model can also be found in theories of boom-and-bust cycles in asset 
markets.10 Let us posit that there are two types of investors who work in “exchange alley:” V 
is the small group of value investors, who rely on a Graham-and-Dodd-style (2008) analysis 
of fundamental values. T is the trend followers, who rely on chart techniques and trends or 
simply popularity to decide on asset purchases (see Greenwald et al 2001). V and T behave 
similarly to the trend-setters and followers in the fashion example. 
 First, our value investors V identify an asset with fundamentals that suggest a higher 
value than is reflected by the market price. If prices have been stable for a long time, then 
based on chart-technique, the assets have not been very desirable to T and there are no gains 
to expect from a technical rally. As enough members of T have divergent expectations from 
the value investors V, when some value investors show demand for the assets, T sells to V.  
 For both groups the situation seems to be improving: the members of V believe they 
are purchasing more valuable assets while the members of T believe they are selling assets 
that are no longer desirable. As the members of V bid away shares for a price that is above the 
old market price from the members of T the price of the assets increase.  
 The adjustment causes a series of further adjustments in the following periods when T 
sees that the market price of the assets rising. As they either simply follow a trend, or use 
trend-following chart-techniques to analyze the profitability of the assets, the data now 
suggests that prices are likely to rise further and the asset has become more desirable. The 
new outlook is a disruption for T. In response, more and more members of T repurchase the 
asset at a price higher than the members of V thinks it should be, assets are handed over from 
V to T, and prices rise even higher.  
10 Gracia (2004) reaches a similar conclusion. 
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 Once again, everybody seems happy. V sold at a higher price and T has a seemingly 
desirable asset. The outcome is pleasing from the point of view of V and T. The members of 
V, however, now have already sold all of the assets they have to sell, the members of T have 
now bought, and there no longer is anyone to drive the price up further. 
 Assuming that the group of T holds all these assets and the initial valuation of the 
group of V is unchanged, no one in the group of V is willing to buy assets at this higher price 
anymore. Members of the group of T might keep on trading stocks at ever-increasing prices 
within the group. But already the group of T holds assets that are less valuable (according to 
the value investors) than they believe. Once prices stop rising, the trend-followers’ views 
about the desirability of the assets worsen, so that they want to sell. But now neither T nor F 
wants to buy at the current price, forcing the price down. The cycle starts over again once 
prices fall below the fundamental value calculated by the value investors V, returning us to 
our initial situation. 
f. Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis 
Multiple triggers have been posited that may drive business cycles, such a rise or shortfall in 
demand, a supply shock, a monetary policy shock, or technological advances in a specific 
sector. Kindleberger (2000, pp.38-41) argues—more generally—that to produce substantial 
boom periods that eventually turn bust, an event or change has to be important enough to 
substantially change the “horizons” and “expectations” of market participants, i.e., to present 
a major disruption requiring adjustments that are at first, anyway, de-stabilizing. From an 
historical perspective he finds wars, revolutions, monetary policy changes, bank 
deregulations, but also financial innovations such as derivatives to be capable of radically 
changing expectations in the market and producing cycles. To explain the stages of the cycle 
and financial crises he draws on Hyman Minsky’s theory of financial instability. 
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In Minsky’s model the financing structure of an economy cycles due to the tension 
between two populations. Minsky initially assumes a state of stability of the financial 
structure. Following a crisis, there is a high degree of risk aversion. On the one hand, 
households are hesitant to borrow from banks. On the other hand, banks are scared of the risks 
entailed in lending and will ask for good collateral. Therefore, at first, there is only some 
hedge financing and risks in the economy are limited due to large safety margins. But during 
the period of recovery of an economy debts can be repaid. It seems that going into debt pays 
off and safety margins may be too high (Minsky 1982, p. 65). The amounts of hedge 
financing increase as households can validate debt.  
When views on the right amount of leverage and safety margins start to change, the 
financial structure is disrupted. The shift in beliefs is destabilizing as more and more risks are 
accumulated over time that increase the likelihood of a necessary later adjustment. The 
economy starts to gradually move “from hedge to speculative and Ponzi finance” (Minsky 
2008, p. 233). Like in a two-population predator-prey model, the increase in hedge financing 
has put the ground for its decline and the rise of speculative financing. 
During the upswing of the cycle an increasing number of people turn optimistic. Debt 
financings increases asset prices and investment. The economy moves into a speculative 
boom. The stream of adjustments during which the financial structure becomes more and 
more leveraged and dependent on changes in financial markets ends when, e.g., interest rates 
in financial markets rise so that serving the debt becomes harder. In such a way, speculative 
finance can turn into Ponzi finance that depends on rolling over the debt. But if interest rates 
prevent rolling-over debt, businesses will have to reduce borrowing and investment. Asset 
prices fall. Given that the financial structure has moved to a point at which much of financing 
is speculative, banks may be unwilling to extend loans altogether (Minsky 1982, pp. 66-67). 
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At this point, households and firms start to pay down debt and try to build liquidity. 
Banks deal with losses, shorten balance sheets and contract credit. A destabilizing 
deflationary spiral continuous unless monetary and/or fiscal policy stimulates aggregate 
demand enough to stop the balance sheet recession (Minsky 1992). When investment and 
stock markets pick up again, households, banks and businesses gain through rising equity 
prices. Optimism spreads again and the debt cycle begins anew. 
In Minsky’s model, “profit opportunities within a robust financial structure make the 
shift from robustness to fragility an endogenous phenomenon” (Minsky 2008, p. 234). 
Therefore, Minsky’s theory is both endogenous, at least once the central bank is included in 
the model to revive the economy, and a true cycle, since there is a good reason to think it will 
often do so.  
g. Schumpeter’s Creative Destruction and Economic Development 
Joseph Schumpeter’s famed theory of economic development (1934, 1942) combines 
psychological, sociological, technological and economic elements to explain the medium to 
long run development in a capitalist society. The dynamic entrepreneur is at the center of the 
theory and the engine of progress.  
According to Schumpeter: 
The opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organizational development 
from the craft shop to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same process of industrial 
mutation?—if I may use that biological term—that incessantly revolutionizes the 
economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a 
new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. 
(1942 [2008], p. 83) 
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In Schumpeter’s theory dynamic entrepreneurs are alert to profit opportunities and willing to 
take the risks needed to implement technological innovations. If they are successful, 
economic development is fostered. 
 The theory describes a cycle that once again is based the disruptions and adjustments 
of two distinct populations. Before Schumpeter’s dynamic entrepreneur introduces a 
technological innovation the economy proceeds smoothly. The entrepreneur's innovation 
disrupts plans of other economic actors in the economy and induces multiple adjusting 
changes in the economy. First, both consumers and competitors face uncertainty about how 
the new situation affects their plans. Therefore, the following adjustment process may take 
time and comprise multiple feedback loops. 
 If the innovation earns the entrepreneur a pure profit, others will sell less than they 
planned, a monopoly may lose its monopoly rents, or the innovation will make some 
industries obsolete. Once other, less innovative entrepreneurs understand the reason for the 
innovator’s profits they will adopt the innovation to arbitrage away the profit opportunities via 
imitation. They, too, want to make the gains. While imitation helps spread the innovation 
throughout the economy it also drives down the profits of the dynamic entrepreneur as the 
technological advance is absorbed throughout the economy. So, again, we have a two-
population model, with the innovators creating changes that their followers respond to, 
creating a new equilibrium. 
h. R.M. Goodwin’s Growth Cycle 
We finally turn to a case of a business cycle theory that has very explicitly made use of the 
predator-prey model and the Lotka-Volterra equations. In the initial statement of this model, 
after a page of mathematically positing relationships between output, capital, wage rates, 
productivity and employment, Goodwin writes: 
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In this form we recognize the Volterra case of prey and predator… to some extent the 
similarity is purely formal, but not entirely so. It has long seem to me that Volterra’s 
problem of the symbiosis of two populations—partly complementary, partly hostile—is 
helpful in understanding what the dynamical contradictions of capitalism,  especially 
when stating any more or less Marxian form. (1967, p. 55) 
One would guess from Goodwin’s statement above and his Marxist background that the two 
populations would be the capitalists and the workers, with the capitalists obviously taking the 
role of predators. But one would be wrong: in Goodwin’s actual model, the populations are 
not really populations at all: the “prey” turns out to be the employment rate, while the 
“predator” is the worker’s share of output. But Goodwin still sees a relationship between the 
formal model to the actual populations of workers and capitalists: 
[A] low growth rate leads to a fall in output and employment to well below full 
employment, thus restoring profitability to its average value because productivity is now 
rising faster than wage rates. This is, I believe, essentially what Marx meant by the 
contradiction of capitalism and its transitory resolution in booms and slumps. It is, 
however, un-Marxian in asserting that profitability is restored not (necessarily) by a fall 
in real wages but rather by their failing to rise with productivity.  Real wages must fall in 
relation to productivity; they may fall absolutely as well, depending on the severity of the 
cycle. The improved profitability carries the seed of its own distraction by engendering a 
too vigorous expansion of output and employment, thus destroying the reserve army of 
labour and strengthening labour’s bargaining power.  This inherent conflict and 
complementarity of workers and capitalists is typical of symbiosis. (1967, p. 58) 
Since Goodwin’s original paper, he and others have done further work within this framework. 
For instance, Mehrling (1986) added game-theoretic foundations to the original model, while 
Desai et al. (2004) fix some problems in the mathematics that had allowed wages to be over 
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100% of output and employment to rise over 100%, and Sportelli (1995) seeks to eliminate 
the instability in Goodwin’s original model. 
In any case, this paper can be seen as a generalization of this insight of Goodwin’s: not 
only the Marxist business cycle theory, but many other cycle theories can be modeled starting 
with the predator-prey foundation. 
 
5  Putting This Family Resemblance to Work in Modeling 
We are currently working on testing out the power of noting this family resemblance 
in Indra, an agent-based modeling system we are constructing.11 On top of a basic framework 
for creating agents we have constructed a basic predator-prey framework. Using that as a 
further platform for development, we have duplicated the main idea of Adam Smith’s fashion 
model. And now we are proceeding to try to capture the dynamics of the value-investor/trend-
follower model for financial markets. 
So far, the results born out our intuition that keeping the family resemblance of these 
models in mind is a great aid in implementing them on a computer. Where is our predator-
prey model took almost 350 lines of code to implement, by using object-oriented 
programming techniques and inheriting the second model from the first, we were able to add 
the fashion cycle model with only another 200 lines of code. As we proceed to implement 
further models from this family, we expect to see an even greater degree of code re-use in the 
future. The ability to be re-use large amounts of code is a key goal in software engineering, 




                                                 
not only, or even mainly, because of the initial time savings in development that it provides, 
but more so for its savings over the lifecycle of a project, as the common code can be 
enhanced in a single place, and benefit all of the models using that common core. 
And implementing these models in an agent-based framework is of value for social 
theorists, we contend, as a computer-based implementation allows for a tremendous increase 
in the theorist’s ability to explore the “world in the model.” As Mary Morgan puts it, 
“Economists (just like their astronomer forebears) understand that a model stands in for their 
economic universe to enable them to explore certain properties of that world represented in 
the model” (2012, p. 33). In doing just such exploration, we have often been struck by just 
how sensitive these models are to slight variations in the parameters used to set up the model 
and start it running. Recognizing family resemblances amongst models enables researchers to 
set up, and begin exploring, new variations with much greater ease. 
6 Conclusion 
We have described a broad range of cycle theories using the concepts of disruption and 
adjustments. Many important theories are true endogenous social cycle theories in which 
adjustment processes themselves give rise to new disruptions or the theory provides a reason 
why the cycle should recur. Further, analyzing the theories we have found that many social 
cycle theories seem to fit with a two-population disruption and adjustment model similar to 
the well-known predator-prey model. Finally, we have demonstrated that the recognition of 
this family resemblance among these theories enables us to create a general modeling 
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